

01955

1996/06/20

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER
+-----PERSONAL FOR-----

PRIORITY/ROUTINE
P R 200339Z JUN 96
FM USDAO BEIJING CH
TO SECDEF WASHDC//USDP// PRIORITY
INFO SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP// JCS WASHDC//J2/J5//
SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J5/J2//
DIA WASHDC//DR/CC/DH-3A//

~~CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING CH~~

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CITE: 0559/103

RETRANSMITTAL OF USDAO BEIJING MSG 0559 DTG 180840Z JUN 96 PER YOUR REQUEST

PASS: (U) PERSONAL FOR MR. SLOCOMBE (USDP); INFO SECDEF FOR DR. CAMPBELL AND COL EIKENBERRY (ISA-AP); CINCPAC FOR ADM PREUHER (J3), MG STEELE (JS) AND RADM JACOBY (J2); SECSTATE MR. WIEDEMANN AND MR. BADER (EAP); JCS MG KING (J2) AND BG FOGLESONG (JS); DIA FOR LTG HUGHES (DR), BG KERRICK (CC) AND DR. FONTANA (DH-3A) FROM BG MIKE BYRNES.

SUBJ: YOUR VISIT TO CHINA (U)

1. (C) AMBASSADOR SASSER AND USDAO BEIJING LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT TO BEIJING. WE SEE THIS VISIT AS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP THE SINO-U.S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. YOUR VISIT COMES AT A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TIME IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AS BOTH SIDES ARE IN THE MIDST OF ASSESSING THE EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR AND ARE DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH EACH OTHER IN THE NEAR TERM.

2. (C) WHILE THE U.S. POSITION HAS EVOLVED CONSIDERABLY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS TOWARD A ROUGH CONSENSUS ON CHINA POLICY, THE MAIN CHARACTERISTIC OF CHINA'S CURRENT APPROACH TO THE U.S. IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHARPLY CONTRASTING VIEWS. THESE CONTRASTING VIEWS ARE MANIFEST IN VACILLATING POLICY PROCLAMATIONS ON THE U.S. ON ANY GIVEN DAY ONE CAN PICK UP CHINESE PRESS ARTICLES HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. AND OTHER ARTICLES WHICH ARE MUCH MORE MODERATE IN TONE. I BELIEVE THESE MIXED AND CONTRARY MESSAGES REFLECT AN ONGOING DEBATE WITHIN THE CHINESE BUREAUCRACY ON THE FOCUS OF U.S. OBJECTIVES TOWARDS CHINA AND, IN TURN, HOW CHINA SHOULD RELATE TO THE U.S.

5. ~~(C)~~ BACKGROUND.

A. ~~(C)~~ CHINESE STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS. FOLLOWING THE DENG XIAOPING-INITIATED STRATEGIC SHIFT IN 1985, CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNERS HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF JOLTS WHICH HAVE LEFT STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING IN A STATE OF CONFUSION. IN THE 1960'S THE PRC ADOPTED A NORTHWARD ORIENTED, LARGE SCALE, NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIO IN WHICH CHINA WOULD BE ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE. IN THE LATE 1980'S, CHINA REFOCUSSED ON A SOUTHWARD THREAT OF LOCAL, LIMITED WARS WITH A GREATER OFFENSIVE CONTENT THAN THE PRE-1985 STRATEGY. EVENTS SUCH AS TIANANMEN, THE GULF WAR, AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE COMBINED TO DISRUPT THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS. THE LACK OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS THREAT AND THE LACK OF LEADERSHIP FOCUS ON THE MILITARY COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY HAVE TENDED TO INHIBIT STRATEGIC THINKING.

JOINT STAFF V1
ACTION
INFO NMCC:CVO(1) JSAMS(1) JS:SPEC(1)

(M.C)

3

SECDEF V2
ACTION
INFO CHAIRS-SPECIAL(1) SECDEF-C(1)
USDP EXCLUSIVE/PERSONAL FOR(B)

(M.C)

8

DIA V3
ACTION
INFO +DIA/SPEC

(M.C)

0

C. (C) THE PLA'S STATED MILITARY STRATEGY IS THE VAGUELY DEFINED STRATEGY OF ACTIVE DEFENSE. SOMEWHERE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF ACTIVE DEFENSE IS THE SO CALLED STRATEGY OF LOCAL WARS. THIS IMPLIES A SHIFT FROM A CONTINENTAL FOCUS TO A MARITIME FOCUS. IF, AS IT APPEARS, THIS SHIFT IS ACTUALIZED, IT WILL MARK A

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STRATEGIC REVOLUTION. THERE IS MUCH EVIDENCE THAT SUCH A STRATEGY IS BEING IMPLEMENTED. THERE HAS BEEN MORE FOCUS RECENTLY ON AIR AND MARITIME MODERNIZATION, WITH POSSIBLE END GOAL OF DEVELOPING A LIMITED POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY. OVERRIDING THIS ACTIVE DEFENSE AND LOCAL WAR CONCEPT IS THE PLA'S EMPHASIS ON OPERATING IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT. U.S. SUCCESSES DURING THE GULF WAR AGAINST SOVIET STYLE FORCES, EQUIPMENT, AND TACTICS SHOCK THE PLA TO ITS ROOTS AND RESULTED IN A MAJOR EMPHASIS ON TECHNOLOGICAL TRAINING FOR ITS FORCES.

E. (b) WHILE CHINA'S STATUS AS A GREAT NATION IS INCREASINGLY APPARENT, IT IS STILL LEARNING HOW TO SHOULDER THE BURDENS OF A GREAT NATION AND HOW TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY. WE DO NOT SEE CHINA AS A THREAT, BUT WE BELIEVE CHINA MUST BE MORE OPEN AND SENSITIVE TO THE SECURITY PERCEPTIONS OF ITS NEIGHBORS. THIS POINT NEEDS TO BE EMPHASIZED TO YOUR CHINESE HOSTS. THE CHINESE APPEAR OBLIVIOUS TO THE IMPACT OF THEIR SECURITY AND MILITARY ACTIONS ON OTHERS IN THE REGION. CHINA IS LESS THAN OPEN IN ITS EXPLANATION OF ITS GROWING DEFENSE BUDGET, MILITARY MODERNIZATION, AND MILITARY STRATEGY. THIS LACK OF OPENNESS OFTEN RESULTS IN GREATER SUSPICION THAN NECESSARY.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 BEIJING CH
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TTE: 0559/103

TRANSMITTAL OF USDAO BEIJING MSG 0559 DTG 180840Z JUN 96 PER YOUR REQUEST

PASS: (U) PERSONAL FOR MR. SLOCUM (USDP); INFO

MCN=96172/03083 TOR=96172/03422 TAD=96172/03492 CDSN=MAK700

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+++PERSONAL FOR+++

- WE APPRECIATE THE PLA'S SUPPORT TO OUR VISITING
DELEGATIONS AND TO OTHER DOD PROGRAMS SUCH AS MIA
ACCOUNTING OPERATIONS.

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CITE: 0559/10J

RETRANSMISSION OF USDAO BEIJING MSG 0559 DTG 180840Z JUN
96 PER YOUR REQUEST

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SECDEF FOR DR. CAMPBELL AND COL EIKENBERRY (ISA-AP);
CINCPAC FOR ADM PREUHER (J00), MG STEELE (J5) AND RADW
JACOBY (J2); SECSTATE MR. WIEDEMANN AND MR. BADER
(EAP); JCS MG KING (J2) AND BG FOGLESONG (J5); DIA FOR
LTG HUGHES (DR), BG KERRICK (CC) AND DR. FONTANA (DH-
3A) FROM BG MIKE BYRNES.

SUBJ: YOUR VISIT TO CHINA (U)

RELATIONSHIP. AS THE SECDEF SO APTLY POINTED OUT "IT
TAKES TWO TO TANGO." VERY RESPECTFULLY, MIKE BYRNES,
DATT BEIJING.

DRV FROM: DIA/DH-D MSG 291330Z JAN 96
DECL: X1 BT

MCN=96172/03083 TOR=96172/03422 TAD=96172/03492

CDSN=MAK700

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04 SECT MSG

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